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While economic theory is largely mute on the question of whether macroeconomic
policies affect long-run growth, an examination of the experience of different
countries over various periods and the policies they pursued, lends strong support to
the idea that macro policies do play a role in the growth process.
A macroeconomic policy framework conducive to growth can be characterised by
five features: a low and predictable inflation rate; an appropriate real interest rate; a
stable and sustainable fiscal policy; a competitive and predictable real exchange
rate; and a balance of payments that is regarded as viable. Countries with these
macroeconomic characteristics tend to grow faster than those without them, though
there are many individual cases of both developing and developed countries
suggesting that satisfying only some of these conditions does not sustain strong
growth. It is also important to recognise that the direction of causation is somewhat
ambiguous: while good macro outcomes should be conducive to growth, strong
growth is also conducive to good macroeconomic outcomes.
The paper presents a wide-ranging examination of both theoretical and empirical
evidence on the many ways  macroeconomic policies may influence economic
growth. Given monetary policy’s crucial role in determining the inflation rate in the
longer run, there is a particular emphasis on the relationship between inflation and
growth.
The following five broad conclusions are drawn. First, although growth models
assign a major role to capital accumulation, there is little evidence that aggregate
investment yields excess returns, and so special policy incentives to boost aggregate
investment appear inappropriate. Second, countries with low national saving invest
less and grow more slowly than they would if saving were higher. Ultimately, the
extent to which a country can rely on foreign savings to fund domestic investment
and growth depends on the rate of capital inflow the market accepts as sustainable.
For Australia, with abundant natural resources and a stable political environment,
this may be higher than for many other capital importing countries. Third, declining
national saving rates in many industrial countries are primarily a consequence of
lower government saving, suggesting a need for reduced fiscal deficits. In Australia,
however, private savings have also fallen substantially, suggesting a possible role
for specific incentives to boost private savings.ii
Fourth, when economies are near potential, short-run rises in output seem to be
more inflationary than falls in output are  disinflationary. This implies that
macroeconomic policy acting pre-emptively to counter expected future demand
pressures and quickly mitigating the effects of unexpected shocks has a positive
effect on the level of output, compared with a more hesitant approach acting only
when demand pressures have appeared. Further, provided inflation is kept close to
its target in the medium term, policy which tolerates some short-term deviations of
inflation from its target reduces fluctuations in real output and generates a higher
long-run output level than a policy with the sole goal of keeping inflation close to its
target.
Finally, although most economists believe even moderate rates of inflation adversely
affect growth, unambiguous evidence has been difficult to come by. There is still
professional disagreement on the robustness of the empirical evidence, but it does
appear that higher inflation, and the associated increased uncertainty about future
inflation, adversely affects growth in the industrial countries. The gains from lower




2. An Overview of Long-Run Growth Trends 6
3. Growth Theories and Empirical Evidence 12
3.1 Growth Theories 12
3.2 What Do We Learn From Cross-Country or Panel Studies of
Long-Run Growth? 13
3.3 Specific Effects on Growth 16
3.3.1 Fiscal policy and public investment 16
3.3.2 Aggregate investment 18
3.3.3 Growth and the balance of payments 19
3.3.4 National saving 22
3.3.5 Exchange rate policies 27
3.3.6 Financial markets and financial systems 28
3.3.7 Path dependence and macroeconomic policies 30
4. Inflation and Growth 32
5. Conclusions 44
Appendix A: Influences on Growth 47
A1 The Persistence of Growth Rates and the Determinants of
Growth 47
A2 Growth and Balance of Payments 49
A3 Inflation and Growth 53
References 56MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND GROWTH
Palle Andersen and David Gruen
‘Is there some action a government of Australia could take that would lead the
Australian economy to grow like Korea’s or Taiwan’s? If so, what, exactly? If not,
what is it about the ‘nature of Australia’ that makes it so? The consequences for
human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one
starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else’ (With apologies to
Lucas (1988)).
1. INTRODUCTION
Conferences on  macroeconomics and  macroeconomic developments usually
conclude with a paper on the implications for macro-policies. However, for a
conference on growth, this poses a bit of a dilemma. On the one hand, according to
the natural-rate hypothesis which is accepted by many analysts,  macroeconomic
policies are neutral with respect to long-run real output and employment. Moreover,
in the neoclassical theory of growth, technological progress falls like manna from
heaven and the level of investment – the only variable susceptible to policy changes
– affects the steady-state level of output, but not its rate of change. Endogenous
growth theory recognises that technological change can be endogenous and that
changes in the stock of capital – human as well as non-human – may generate
positive  externalities and are not necessarily subject to diminishing returns.
However, most policy implications are microeconomic in nature and the theory does
not assign any specific role to macroeconomic policies.
On the other hand, when looking at the growth performance of different countries
over various periods and the policies they pursued, it is difficult to believe that
macro-policies did not play a role. The impressive economic achievements of most
industrial countries during the 1950-73 period owed much to reconstruction and
technological catch-ups, but these catch-ups did not take place automatically. They
were facilitated by policies promoting economic integration and investment in
human and non-human capital. Growth was also helped by low inflation, the
absence of fiscal imbalances and stable factor-income shares. While macro-policies
aimed at full employment may well have had a positive effect, they may also have
sowed the seeds for the slowdown during the 1970s and 1980s. The astonishing2
growth performance of the four  NIEs (the four Asian ‘tigers’) and later the
South-East Asian economies also seems to be associated with policies favouring
low inflation and sound fiscal policies. At the same time, the ‘lost decade’ of the
1980s in Latin America and depressing developments in most of Africa can be
traced, not only to political instability, but also to inward-looking policies that
stimulated domestic demand growth while paying little attention to the costs in
terms of inflation and external imbalances.
If we accept the view that actual developments should receive a larger weight than
pure theory, one important question remains: how should ‘ macroeconomic policies’
be defined and measured and through which channels do ‘good’ or ‘bad’ policies
affect growth? In this paper, we associate  macroeconomic policies with monetary,
fiscal and exchange rate policies as reflected in, or measured by, the rate of
inflation, the budget balance, the real rate of interest, the real exchange rate and the
current account of the balance of payments. This is not a very precise definition and
it has the added problem that these measures of macroeconomic policies are to some
extent endogenous to actual economic developments. As regards transmission
channels, we are persuaded by Fischer’s (1993) hypothesis that policies which lead
to high inflation or large internal or external imbalances generate uncertainty which
adversely affects growth. We also discuss additional channels which may exist if
potential output depends on past developments in actual output because of path
dependence.
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section  2 provides a broad review
of macroeconomic developments in the post-war period in an attempt to detect some
preliminary evidence of the role of policies. Section  3 looks at the policy related
variables in the generally-accepted theories of growth and the empirical evidence
from cross-country regressions, reviewing major results as well as problems of
measurement and interpretation. Section 4 deals with the relationship between
inflation and growth while Section  5 summarises and derives tentative policy
implications.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF LONG-RUN GROWTH TRENDS
To gain a preliminary impression of the potential role of  macroeconomic policies,
Table 1 presents long-run trends in per capita income growth over the3
period 1870-1989. Four features are worth noting:
• growth does not evolve along a smooth constant trend – there is clear evidence
of ‘epochs’ of growth, raising important questions as to the causes of trend
breaks;
• the period 1951-73 clearly stands out as a period of exceptionally strong
growth and, seen in a longer perspective, post-1973 developments are
relatively favourable;
• the growth performance of Australia is rather poor compared with that of other
industrial countries, especially during 1951-73 when the growth differential
exceeded one percentage point; and
• among the developing countries, the extraordinary growth performance of the
Asian countries is of relatively recent origin as, prior to 1950, growth in Asia
was well below that of other regions. By contrast, Latin America grew
relatively fast before 1950, while growth was rather slow during 1950-73 and
almost came to a complete halt in the post-1973 period. The same pattern is
even more evident in Africa, following a somewhat better growth performance
during the pre-war period.
Table 1: Long-Run Growth Trends
(Per capita GDP based on PPP weights, per cent per annum)
1870-1913 1914-1950 1951-1973 1974-89
Industrial countries 1.3 1.2 3.5 2.1
Australia 0.9 0.7 2.4 1.7
Asia 0.3 -0.2 3.5 5.2
Latin America 1.3 1.3 2.3 0.6
Africa n.a. 1.6 2.0 0.0
Source: Maddison (1993).
The 1951-73 era is clearly the most interesting one, especially given the
macro-policy activism during the period. To what extent did  ‘good’ policies
contribute to the high growth? It is generally recognised that once-off factors such
as post-war reconstruction and catch-ups with the technological leader
(the United States) had a large part in explaining the favourable growth
performance. Thus excluding the United States, average per capita growth in the4
industrial countries exceeded 4 per cent (compared with less than 1 per cent over
1914-50) while the United States grew by only 2.2 per cent (1.6 per cent). These
unique factors also implied that high growth was unlikely to continue; once the
catch-ups had been completed, growth would return to a slower pace.
The catch-ups did not, however, occur automatically. They were no doubt facilitated
by the move towards free trade and currency convertibility and within each country
they were helped by higher investment in both education and physical capital.
Indeed, by 1973 the investment/GDP ratio for the industrial countries had increased
to over 25 per cent, compared with 22 per cent in 1960 and for the 1960-73 period
on average (Table 2). In some countries with restrictions on capital movements, the
rise in investment may have been helped by low-interest-rate policies. A favourable
social environment, resulting in stable factor-income shares, probably also
stimulated investment. In a few countries, ‘social contracts’ were instrumental in
generating stable factor shares (see Crafts and Toniolo (1995)) but more generally,
the stability was probably the result of the high rate of productivity growth. With
most prices set as a mark-up on unit labour costs, high labour-productivity growth
meant that moderately rising nominal wages translated into growing real wages and
low price inflation. Distributional pressures and disputes could thus be resolved in a
relatively non-inflationary way and without large short-term changes in factor
income shares.
The role of demand-management policies is more difficult to evaluate (and will be
discussed further in Section 3). Attempts to ‘fine tune’ the economy may have been
instrumental in generating relatively stable growth rates during 1950-73, with a
variability about one-third lower than in the inter-war period ( Romer 1988) and also
substantially lower than in the post-1973 period (see  Table 3). This is likely to have
reduced uncertainty and spurred investment. 1 On the other hand, it also appears that
either policy makers went too far in ‘smoothing the cycle’, stimulating output to a
level that, in retrospect, was too high relative to potential output, or they did not
take sufficient account of shocks and other external changes that reduced potential
output. Thus, while inflation was low on average, it accelerated significantly during
the period (Table 2).
1  Kormendi and  Meguire (1985), however, find a positive coefficient for the variability of
income growth in a cross-country regression of per capita income growth.5
Table 2: Performance or ‘Policy’ Indicators
1960-73 1974-82 1983-94 1960-73 1974-82 1983-94
Industrial countries Australia
Inflation, average rate, % 3.7 8.7 4.6 4.6 11.6 5.6
Change in inflation (a) 3.7 -3.3 -2.6 6.2 -4.7 -8.4
Budget balance/GDP, %(b) -0.2 -2.6 -3.1 1.4 -1.7 -2.3
Investment/GDP, % 21.7 22.0 20.9 25.5 24.2 24.6
Exports, % change(c) 8.0 4.2 5.7 7.5 3.4 7.0
Current external account/
  GDP, % 0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -1.7 -2.8 -4.5
External debt/GDP, %(e) n.a. -9.2 -13.2 n.a. 15.9 41.5
Real long-term interest rate 3.0 0.5 4.8 1.1 -2.3 6.7
Sub-Saharan Africa Asia
Inflation, average rate, % 4.7 16.4 24.0 4.2 7.9 8.0
Change in inflation (a) 5.2 3.0 15.0 5.0 -4.5 3.5
Budget balance/GDP, %(b) n.a. n.a. -7.0 n.a. -4.0 -3.3
Investment/GDP, % 17.5 23.0 16.5 19.5 25.0 27.0
Exports, % change(d) 12.0 10.0 4.5 13.5 18.5 12.5
Current external account/
  GDP, %(f) -3.1 0.6 -3.0 -1.3 -2.3 -1.4
External debt, GDP, %(g) 30.7 75.2 82.8 19.6 32.0 37.1
Latin America
Inflation, average rate, % 23.8 49.5 137.5
Change in inflation (a) -5.0 37.0 112.5
Budget balance/GDP, %(b) -2.5 -2.0 -4.0
Investment/GDP, % 20.5 24.0 19.5
Exports, % change(d) 9.2 17.0 2.7
Current external account/
  GDP, %(f)
-2.0 -4.3 -2.0
External debt/GDP, %(g) 36.1 66.1 36.0
Notes: (a) From first to last year of period.
(b) General government for industrialised countries; central government for developing countries.
(c) Goods and services in volumes.
(d) Merchandise exports in US$.
(e) 1984 and 1993, respectively.
(f) First two columns refer to 1970 and 1980 respectively.
(g) 1980, 1987 and 1994, respectively.
Sources: OECD, National Accounts; IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook;
Fischer (1991); and authors’ estimates.6
Table 3: Output Growth: Trends and Variations
(Per cent per annum)
1960-73 1974-82 1983-94
m s m s m s
Industrial countries 4.8 0.95 2.1 1.85 2.9 1.15
Australia 5.1 2.10 2.4 1.55 3.3 2.30
Latin America 6.0 2.50 4.1 3.00 2.1 1.70
Asia 4.7 3.90 5.9 2.30 7.4 1.10
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 2.00 3.3 2.80 1.8 1.70
Note: m denotes average growth of GDP and s standard deviations of growth rates for the periods concerned.
Comparisons with the figures in Table 1 should be made cautiously. The number of countries in each
group is much larger than in Table 1, and the data refer to changes in aggregate real GDP in national
currencies, rather than per capita GDP converted at PPP.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; OECD, National Accounts; and national data.
Moreover, the labour share of income rose in the late 1960s and into the 1970s,
pointing to strains in the social fabric. One tentative conclusion emerging from this
episode is, therefore, that macro-policies aimed at smoothing the cycle may increase
the level as well as the average rate of output growth. However, such changes are
only sustainable if the target level of output does not lead to rising inflation.
Because the productivity slowdown in the early 1970s 2 coincided with the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the rise in oil prices, it is tempting to
associate floating exchange rates and higher oil prices with lower output and
productivity growth. With the perspective of two decades, however, there is little
evidence to support these hypotheses. The share of oil and other energy products in
overall output costs is only around 5 per cent and while some early studies identified
higher energy prices as the principal reason for the growth slowdown, most recent
analyses do not find changes in relative oil and energy prices to be significant. The
terms-of-trade losses suffered by many industrial countries combined with real wage
rigidities have also figured prominently in explanations of the slower growth after
1973, especially for European countries. If, however, ‘real  wage gaps’ were a major
2  A slowdown in trend growth occurred in most industrial countries around 1973, while in
many developing countries, the break seems to have coincided with the second oil price rise
and the debt crisis (see Crafts and Mills (1995) and Ben-David and  Pappell (1995)).7
cause, the terms-of-trade gain following the decline in oil prices in the mid 1980s
should have boosted growth and reduced unemployment, which it failed to do. The
evidence is also weak regarding the growth effects of the rise in the variability of
exchange rates: some have found that high variability has an adverse effect on trade
but most have found no significant effects. 3 It seems more likely that these two
events were themselves the results of the previous developments and policies and
that the slowdown would have occurred in their absence, though it might have been
less abrupt.
Some have also associated the productivity slowdown with the change in the
consensus view of economic policies from a  Keynesian paradigm based on
fine-tuning economies at close to full employment to a neoclassical paradigm
stressing market forces and giving high priority to low inflation. However, the
change in policy regimes did not take place overnight (though by the early 1980s
most industrial countries had accepted this new view) and was thus less sharp than
the 1973 trend-shift would suggest. A more plausible interpretation would seem to
be that part of the high growth rate generated during the  Keynesian regime was
unsustainable and part of the slowdown during the neoclassical regime reflects the
‘costs of repairing the damage’ caused by the earlier policies.
This combination of over-expansionary policies followed by a period of
re-establishing  macroeconomic balance is even more striking for Latin America
(Adams and Davis 1994). Although there was some slowdown between 1960-73
and 1974-82, growth in the latter period was still relatively high but, as it turned out,
mainly based on fiscal and monetary policies aimed at expanding domestic demand.
These policies  did succeed in raising output growth, but they also resulted in
widening fiscal imbalances, accelerating inflation and, above all, in steeply rising
external deficits and levels of foreign debt. The  unsustainability of the situation
became evident in 1982, when world real interest rates rose and the measures
required to correct the past mistakes resulted in the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, too, short-term policies – to a large extent in the form of
expanding the public sector – helped to maintain relatively high growth in the 1970s.
However, since the earlier 1980s, aggregate growth has averaged less than
3  On the other hand, maintaining exchange rates at le vels that are not consistent with
‘fundamentals’ can have adverse output effects (see Section 3). Such policies are more likely
under fixed than under flexible exchange rate regimes.8
2 per cent, partly because of a 30 per cent fall in the terms of trade and other
external shocks, but also as a result of correcting unsustainable fiscal imbalances
and over-expansionary policies, reinforced by a large burden of foreign debt and
limited access to international capital markets.
3. GROWTH THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
3.1 Growth Theories
For three decades, growth theory was dominated by the neoclassical  Solow-Swan
model in which output growth is determined by technical progress and growth in
capital and labour inputs. 4 This model provides few channels for macro-policy
influences. Thus, technical progress is assumed to be exogenous and most empirical
studies do not suggest macro-policies have much influence on labour force growth.
Capital growth, however, could be influenced by policies and, as further discussed
below, the neoclassical model is often used to analyse the growth effect of
policy-induced changes in capital stock growth or changes in the investment/GDP
ratio. Moreover, when the Solow-Swan model is extended to include human as well
as physical capital, it is possible to explain per capita income growth in a broad
range of countries and show that, after controlling for the determinants of
steady-state income levels, poor countries grow faster than rich ones:  i.e. that there
is ‘conditional’ convergence in per capita income levels ( Mankiw,  Romer and
Weil 1992).
It is also possible to  disaggregate changes in capital into various types of
investment, including public investment in infrastructure. Of course, as long as the
framework of the neoclassical model is maintained, policy-induced changes in the
growth of capital or the investment/GDP ratio do not change steady-state output
growth but only the steady-state output level. In practice, however, this may be of
limited importance because the transition period between steady states is very long,
4  More formally, the Solow-Swan model assumes that output, Y, is determined by an aggregate
production function,  Y = F L,K,E ( ) where L is labour, K is the gross capital stock and E is
technical progress. The production function is often assumed to be  Cobb-Douglas with
constant returns to scale, which implies that  D1nY = 1- b ( )D1n L+ bD1nK + e  or
Dq = bDk + e  where  q =1n Y L ( ),  k =1n K L ( ),  1-b and  b are the output  elasticities of
labour and capital, respectively, and e is the rate of technical progress.9
so that growth over extended periods (as opposed to steady-state growth) is
affected.5
Romer (1986) initiated an explosion of research on how to explain or ‘ endogenise’
technical progress in theories of long-run growth ( Dowrick 1995). For the purpose
of this paper, the most important features are the emphasis on capital or a specific
type of capital as the principal determinant of growth and the possibility of
externalities or imperfect competition implying that markets may not generate a
Pareto optimum in general. Or, to put the second point differently, if firms and other
economic agents cannot internalise all the benefits of their investments, the growth
of capital will be below the socially optimal rate.
3.2 What Do We Learn From Cross-Country or Panel Studies of Long-Run
Growth?
Most of the specific policy measures suggested by endogenous growth theories are
microeconomic in nature and macroeconomic policies as defined in this paper rarely
appear. Nonetheless, based on the experience of the 1970s and 1980s, many
economists came to believe that sound  macroeconomic policies were conducive to
long-run sustainable growth.  Fischer (1993) lists five conditions which together
imply that a  macroeconomic framework is conducive to growth: a low and
predictable inflation rate; an appropriate real interest rate; a stable and sustainable
fiscal policy; a competitive and predictable real exchange rate; and a balance of
payments that is regarded as viable.
Fischer stresses uncertainty, arguing that a government that allows a high budget
deficit or a high rate of inflation has lost control and generates uncertainty.
Uncertainty and its effects on volatility are also the transmission channels stressed
by Pindyck and Solimano (1993) who attempt to identify the principal determinants
of variations in investment/GDP ratios over time and between countries. In all their
5  For example, assuming the parameter estimates in  Mankiw et al. (1992), a 20 per cent rise in
the savings ratio raises the steady-state level of labour productivity by 10 per cent. However,
only half the adjustment is completed in 35 years and during the transition phase, labour
productivity growth is approximately 0.15  percentage points (5/35) higher than prior to the
change in saving.10
regressions, they find inflation to be the main source of volatility in the marginal
return to investment and of variations in the investment/GDP ratio. 6
Indeed, with capital accumulation the principal determinant of long-run growth in
both the neoclassical model and most versions of endogenous growth models, the
determination of capital expenditure is likely to be an important transmission
channel for  macroeconomic policies and it might even be argued that
macroeconomic policies should be designed with a view to stimulating capital
expenditure. Moreover, if capital flows are less than perfectly mobile internationally
or, for other reasons, balance-of-payments considerations act as a constraint on
growth, the level of national saving and ways to raise it through policies – notably
fiscal policy – become relevant as well. We address these issues in Section 3.3,
following a brief discussion of measurement issues and problems of interpretation. 7
Returning to Fischer’s five conditions, note that they are not independent of each
other, and there are plenty of individual country cases showing that satisfying one or
two of these conditions is not enough. The most striking recent example is Mexico
which in the 1990s, but before the December 1994 crisis, achieved a low inflation
rate and consolidated its fiscal situation. However, growth remained low, because
the real exchange rate was not competitive, leading to a  nonviable balance of
payments, combined with volatile but mostly quite high real interest rates. The
members of the African franc zone provide another example. Because of the
currency link with the French franc until early 1994 inflation was low, but over time
the real exchange rate became increasingly uncompetitive and growth was well
below even the modest rates of other African countries. Turning to the developed
6  This result also implies that attempts to capture the adverse effects of inflation in growth
equations that control for the investment/GDP ratio will fail if inflation only affects growth
via changes in investment; a point we return to in Section 4.
7  Investment and saving are, however, not the only channels by which policies can affect
growth over long periods. As suggested by Boltho and Holtham (1992), one empirical fact
that a theory of growth needs to explain is why some countries grow at very high rates over
long periods without encountering signs of decreasing returns to capital and/or labour. As
discussed by Dowrick (1995), one reason for this is that these countries are on a transition
path, catching up with the technological leader. Second, long-run growth could contain
important elements of hysteresis, due to the existence of non- linearities and  asymmetries,
which again would make the growth path sensitive to  macroeconomic policies. These issues
will be further discussed in Section 3.3.11
countries, several members of the European Community achieved low inflation,
competitive exchange rates and viable balances of payments in the eighties and early
nineties, but growth remained low because real interest rates were generally high
and in several countries the fiscal situation was regarded as unsustainable. At the
other end of the spectrum, many of the fast-growing Asian countries are often seen
as being helped by their stable  macroeconomic policies (Hughes 1995) including
low inflation, sound fiscal policies, competitive exchange rates and balance of
payments deficits that are generally regarded as viable because they reflect high
imports of capital goods. Chile, which has achieved very high growth rates since the
mid 1980s should also be mentioned as one country where macro-policies appear to
have been instrumental in generating a transition from stabilisation to high and
sustainable growth.8
The above list is by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, finding clear evidence of
policy influences from empirical studies has proven difficult. There seem to be
four reasons for this. First, because all five conditions need to be satisfied, analyses
including only a subset are unlikely to produce conclusive evidence. On the other
hand, because the five conditions are not independent of each other,
multicollinearity problems often mar studies that include indicators of all conditions.
Second, several countries have managed to grow strongly even over rather long
periods (most notably Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s) before the
accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances caused a slowdown. These exceptions
from the general rule have lasted long enough to have exerted a distorting influence
on analyses based on cross country comparisons. Third, none of the conditions can
be directly related to policy instruments or ‘executable’ policies, but need to be
proxied by other measures that are not necessarily exogenous with respect to
general economic developments. In other words, analyses of policy effects will
suffer from simultaneity or dual causality problems. Finally, even if these problems
could be overcome, the coefficients estimated from cross-country regressions
measure the strength of partial correlations and care must be exercised when
interpreting them as behavioural relations and in deriving policy implications.
8  On a different tack, Sachs and Warner (1995) stress policies that protect property rights and
promote openness, arguing that reversible policy mistakes in these two areas rather than
initial conditions are the principal reasons for the absence of convergence in growth rates
across countries.12
We conclude with a final point concerning the relative persistence of growth and
macro-policy indicators. For most countries, levels of output and country
characteristics, including many policy-related variables, are highly persistent
through time, while growth rates are not (Easterly  et al. 1993). In the Appendix, we
verify this pattern of persistence for the OECD countries and discuss its relevance.
As Easterly  et al. argue, it suggests that while the differential shocks that hit
countries play a big role in determining the cross-country variation in growth rates,
macro-policies and other country characteristics are also important in explaining
growth, in particular when countries are far from their steady-state incomes but also
through the reaction of policies to shocks.
3.3 Specific Effects on Growth
Despite the problems raised above, we now turn to empirical estimates of specific
policies, starting with fiscal policy and issues relating to investment and continuing
with a discussion of possible balance-of-payments constraints on growth and the
role of national saving. We then turn to the relationship between exchange rate
policies and growth, the role of financial markets and the implications of path
dependence for macroeconomic policy.9
3.3.1 Fiscal policy and public investment
A large number of cross-country analyses of growth have included measures of
fiscal policy, focusing on three issues in particular: the relationship between the  size
of the public sector and growth; the likely adverse impact of fiscal imbalances and
public debt; and whether certain types of public expenditure are associated with
special positive or negative growth effects. Easterly and  Rebelo (1994) is one of the
most recent and most comprehensive studies dealing with the fiscal policy issues. It
uses a new database for the public sector and analyses various indicators of fiscal
policy and their effect on long-run per capita growth, including the budget balance,
average tax rates, government consumption expenditure and public investment. The
indicators are  imbedded in a  Barro (1991)-type equation estimated across
50-75 countries. Among the many
9  We don’t address the relationship between incomes policies and growth. For differing views
on the implications of the Australian Prices and Incomes Accord for growth, see
Blandy (1990), Chapman (1990), Fane (1990), and Gruen and Grattan (1993).13
results reported the following are worth noting:
• like most other analysts, Easterly and Rebelo find that the coefficients obtained
for measures of the size of the public sector are fragile;
• the budget balance has a significant and positive coefficient, meaning that
countries running large fiscal deficits tend to have lower growth (implying, of
course, a failure of Ricardian debt neutrality); and
• public consumption seems to have a negative effect on growth, whereas public
investment has a positive effect, with the strongest effects found for central and
general government investment and for investment in education and transport
facilities.
These results on public investment are consistent with a number of other recent
studies which have looked at investment in infrastructure. While there has been a
secular decline in the ratio of public investment to GDP in virtually all industrial
countries, the implications of this decline were largely ignored until
Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) found that a 1 per cent increase in the stock of public
capital in the United States raised private sector capital productivity by 0.4  per cent,
implying very high returns on public sector investment. 10 Equally high estimates
have been obtained for Australia (Otto and  Voss 1994a, 1994b) and for other
countries as well.
Following  Aschauer’s startling results numerous other studies appeared, many of
which cast doubt on his estimates (Gramlich 1994). While it would go too far to
review this debate, there appear to be two principal implications for  macroeconomic
policies. First, reducing public investment merely as a means of cutting the
government borrowing requirement is not an optimal long-run policy. Second, while
federal grants encouraging infrastructure investment projects (which are mostly
undertaken by State and local governments) with particularly high returns might be
an area of policy relevance, the current consensus is for increased reliance on user
fees or privatisation of infrastructure capital.
10  In this context, note that the ratio of public investment to total government expenditure has
averaged 17 per cent in South-East Asia but only 8 per cent in Latin America; see  Adams and
Davis (1994).14
3.3.2 Aggregate investment
The above conclusion still leaves open the question whether, given the role of
capital growth in both the neoclassical and endogenous growth models, fiscal policy
should provide special incentives for investment in general. As a starting point,
consider the neoclassical model assuming a  Cobb-Douglas production function with
constant returns to scale as given in footnote 4 above. For most countries with
capital stock data, estimates yield values for b of about 0.3, implying that increasing
the rate of growth of the capital stock per worker by 1 percentage point raises
annual output growth per worker by 0.3 points. When capital stock figures are not
available or subject to large measurement errors,  Dk may be approximated by the
investment/GDP ratio and the growth equation estimated as:
Dq = r +d ( ). I /Y ( )+ e (1)
where d denotes the rate of depreciation and r the required net rate of return.
When equation (1) is estimated across both developed and developing countries,
Fischer (1993) and  Dowrick (1994) find (r+d) in the range 0.15-0.20 while
Englander and Gurney estimate (r+d)  at 0.09 and at only 0.06 when the sample is
confined to the OECD countries. For  d of approximately 0.05 (based on data for all
OECD countries and assuming an average capital/output ratio of 2.5) the net return
will be in the range 0.05-0.15 for the whole sample, but only around 0.01 for  OECD
countries. Moreover, when estimating the determinants of total -factor productivity
growth, Englander and  Gurney find that growth in the capital/labour ratio has no
significant influence. 11
On balance, the empirical evidence on aggregate investment does not point to very
large positive  externalities, nor does it provide strong support for special
incentives.12 Since in most countries there are numerous examples of distortions in
11  Gordon (1995), who analyses the adjustments of unemployment and the capital stock to
various supply shocks to the labour market, reports results that are even more ‘damaging’.
Looking at the slowdown in labour-productivity growth between 1960-73 and 1979-92 in six
of the G7 countries, he finds that it is mostly due to slower growth of total-factor
productivity, whereas there is no systematic relation between changes in the contribution of
capital per working hour and labour productivity.
12  Furthermore, while higher investment boosts  economic growth, higher output growth also
encourages investment. As a consequence, the estimated coefficient in equation (1) is likely15
relative prices due to the existing tax and subsidy structure, the current consensus
appears to be that policies to encourage investment should mainly consist of
reducing or eliminating existing distortions rather than attempting to ‘pick winners’
(see also Auerbach (1992)). In particular, tax systems in several countries, including
Australia, distort relative prices in favour of residential investment, encouraging a
type of capital expenditure and a composition of total investment which does not
encourage long-run growth.
3.3.3 Growth and the balance of payments
A country’s balance of payments position may influence its level or rate of growth
of output in several plausible ways. In our discussion, we examine a range of
possible influences, and focus particularly on the Australian experience.
If international capital flows are highly mobile, saving acts as a constraint on
investment and growth for the world as a whole, but not for any individual country,
as capital flows from countries with excess saving to those where profitable
investment exceeds domestic saving. Access to foreign savings enables individual
countries to fund higher domestic investment than would otherwise be possible.
The extent of international capital mobility, however, remains an unresolved issue.
On the one hand, tests based on comparisons of interest rates such as
onshore-offshore differentials suggest a high degree of capital mobility between
countries. On the other hand, research examining the behaviour of real variables,
like saving and investment correlations, consumption behaviour across countries,
and the implications of the  intertemporal approach to the balance of payments,
suggest that even without institutional or legal barriers inhibiting the flow of capital
internationally, the owners and managers of each nation’s savings act to keep almost
all of it at home (Feldstein and Horioka 1980; Tesar and Werner 1992; Lewis 1993;
Obstfeld 1994; Feldstein 1995a, 1995b;  Bayoumi and  Klein 1995). This evidence
therefore suggests that the balance of payments does act as a constraint, in the sense
that countries with current account deficits invest less, and grow more slowly, than
they would if domestic savings were higher. (A  similar constraint would apply if
domestic policy was aimed at maintaining external balance.)
                                                                                                                                                      
to overstate the extent to which higher investment  causes higher output growth. There have
also been a number of recent studies dealing with the growth effects of special types of
investment, especially expenditure on machinery and equipment (see  Dowrick, 1995).16
One version of the idea that the balance of payments imposes a constraint on growth
is presented by  McCombie and  Thirlwall (1994), hereafter MT. MT develop a
demand-side model in which the growth rate ‘consistent with balance -of-payments
equilibrium’ is determined by the rate of growth in total revenues available for
expanding imports, allowing for the effect of terms -of-trade changes, changes in
export volumes and net capital flows, and by the income elasticity of imports.
Applying the MT approach to Australia suggests a growth rate consistent with
balance-of-payments equilibrium of between 2 and 3 per cent per annum, well
below the trend rate of growth of the Australian economy (see the Appendix for
details).
The MT analysis uses an elasticities approach to the balance of payments, and as
such, ignores the response of domestic savers and investors to the aggregate wealth
implications of rising external indebtedness. It also excludes any real exchange rate
change as part of the adjustment process. In reality, however, a depreciating real
exchange rate is part of the economy’s response to higher external indebtedness
(Blundell-Wignall,  Fahrer and Heath 1993). We therefore turn to the potential
implications of this depreciation for real output.
A current account deficit of 4.5 per cent of GDP (the Australian average over the
past decade) means that the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP currently rises at
about 1.7 percentage points per annum (again, see the Appendix for technical
details). As a consequence, the Australian dollar depreciates in real terms, at an
estimated average rate of about 0.9 per cent per annum. This slow real depreciation
is needed to generate a surplus on the trade and services account in the longer-run –
which is required to fund the income payments on foreign liabilities. As the external
liabilities ratio rises, the extent of required real depreciation also rises.
A depreciating real exchange rate, however, exerts upward pressure on the domestic
price of imports, and creates domestic inflationary pressure. To keep inflation from
rising then requires real unit labour costs to fall at an estimated average rate of about
0.4 per cent per annum (or, equivalently, real wages to rise at an average of 0.4 per
cent per annum slower than labour productivity growth). 13
13  See the Appendix for this estimate. An alternative way to view the issue may also be helpful.
With traded goods prices determined in world markets, traded goods inflation is higher than
domestic inflation when the real exchange rate is depreciating. For domestic inflation to17
In principle, if real exchange rate depreciation proceeds smoothly and gradually, the
labour market can deliver the required gradual fall in real unit labour costs without
adverse consequences on the level of output in the economy. In practice, the gradual
real depreciation is superimposed on large, medium-term, movements of the
exchange rate (predominantly caused by fluctuations in the terms of trade). Hence,
at times it may not be possible for the labour market to adjust sufficiently quickly,
and price inflation will rise. According to estimates presented in the Appendix, in
such situations, the level of output must be kept an average of 0.9 per cent lower
than if there was no real depreciation to be absorbed. This estimate of the average
output cost associated with keeping inflation steady may, however, be overstated as
it assumes the labour market generates no reduction in real unit labour costs without
a fall in output.
Turning to other possible influences, a high and rising level of foreign liabilities may
well generate uncertainty because economic agents are unsure how the situation will
be resolved. As previously discussed, more uncertainty may adversely affect
investment (Pindyck and  Solimano 1993) and therefore growth (Fischer 1993).
There is also empirical evidence that, in general, real interest rates are higher in
countries with large current account deficits ( Orr, Edey and Kennedy 1995) and, in
particular, in Australia (Gruen and Smith 1994) which also has an adverse effect on
investment and growth.
To conclude our discussion, we should point out that we have not directly addressed
the question of whether the rising external liabilities are optimal or not
(Pitchford 1990). Even with limited access to foreign savings, domestic investment
will be higher than would otherwise be possible. Ultimately, the extent to which a
country can rely on foreign savings to fund domestic investment and growth,
depends on the rate of capital inflow the market accepts as sustainable. While it is
impossible to be definitive, the sustainable rate of capital inflow may well be higher
for Australia, with abundant natural resources and a stable political environment,
than for many other capital importing countries.
                                                                                                                                                      
remain steady, therefore, requires non-traded prices to rise more slowly than domestic
inflation which, in turn, requires domestic nominal unit labour costs to rise more slowly than
inflation. This generates widening profit margins in the traded goods sector (since economy-
wide real unit labour costs are falling while the real depreciation is delivering higher output
prices for traded goods) and thereby attracts resources into this sector, as required.18
3.3.4 National saving
As foreshadowed in the previous section, if savings do not move completely freely
between countries, the level of national saving becomes an important determinant of
the level of domestic investment, and hence of domestic growth. As can be seen
from Figure 1, national saving relative to GDP in the world as a whole has fallen
since the 1960s. The decline was slightly more pronounced for Australia, though
Australia is not the only country with a steep decline in national saving. In six other
OECD countries, the savings rate has fallen by 4 1/2 percentage points or more and,
in Figure 2 and Table 4, the experience of these countries with respect to
developments in total saving and its components is compared with that of three
other OECD countries where the national savings rates have been relatively stable
or increased slightly. 14
14  Apart from Turkey, for which a sectoral breakdown of saving is unavailable, Belgium, Japan
and Switzerland are the only OECD countries with relatively stable national savings rates. On
the other hand, while Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Spain have also seen national savings
rates falling by 5-8 per cent of GDP, again their national accounts data do not allow a
sectoral breakdown of saving.19
Figure 1: National Savings, World and Australia
(Percentage of GDP)
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Sources: IMF (1995) and ABS Cat. No. 5206.0.
Table 4: Changes in Saving, Growth and the Current
External Account
(1960s-1990s, percentage points)
Countries NSAV GSAV PSAV ESAV HSAV g BoP
Italy -9.6 -8.9 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 -4.6 -1.9
Australia -8.7 -8.7 0.0 1.6 -1.6 -3.2 -1.9
Canada -6.9 -7.3 0.4 -1.9 2.3 -4.2 -2.3
France -6.2 -5.3 -0.9 3.4 -4.3 -4.5 -0.1
Germany -5.3 -6.8 1.5 0.1 1.4 -1.5 -0.9
United Kingdom -4.9 -6.2 1.3 -0.8 2.1 -2.0 -1.5
United States -4.5 -2.6 -1.9 -1.4 -0.5 -1.8 -2.0
Belgium -0.5 -5.7 5.2 -0.6 5.8 -3.3 3.5
Japan -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 0.7 -8.2 2.4
Switzerland 1.6 -3.1 4.7 -1.0 5.7 -4.1 6.8
Note: NSAV = national saving, GSAV = government saving, PSAV = ESAV + HSAV = private saving,
ESAV = enterprise saving, HSAV = household saving and BoP = current external account, all measured
as percentages of GDP, and g = rate of growth of GDP, annual rate. 1960s and 1990s refer to 1960-69
and 1990-94 respectively.20
Sources: Elmeskov,  Shafer and Tease (1991); OECD,  National Accounts; OECD,  Economic Outlook; IMF,
International Financial Statistics; and authors’ estimates.





































































































Sources: Elmeskov et al. (1991); OECD, National Accounts; OECD, Economic Outlook; IMF,
International Financial Statistics; and authors’ estimates.21
From the figure and the table the following points are worth noting:
• In all but one of the countries where the national savings rate has fallen by
41/2 percentage points or more, the main factor has been the decline in
government saving.15 In fact, in three of the countries, government saving has
fallen by more than national saving. The one exception to this pattern is the
United States, where the decline in national saving is almost equally split
between government and private saving, with lower enterprise saving
accounting for most of the latter.
• The experiences of the three countries with only minor changes in national
saving, Belgium, Japan and Switzerland, show that maintaining a high national
savings rate is not sufficient for generating or maintaining high growth. In all
three countries, average growth fell sharply and this, combined with the
weakening of enterprise saving, obviously had a much stronger adverse impact
on investment than the improvement in household saving. In fact, there is
growing evidence (see Carroll and  Weil (1994) for industrial countries and
World Bank (1993) for eight Asian countries) that the direction of causality
goes, at least to some extent, from growth to saving. In other words, countries
that grow faster tend to generate more saving. 16
• While private saving has generally been stable (main exceptions are Belgium
and Switzerland), in underlying terms they may have fallen, once a partial
Ricardian equivalence effect is taken into account. 17 There have also been
15  This differs markedly from patterns of change in the developing world (IMF 1995;
Edwards 1995). In Asia, national saving rates have been rising, almost entirely because of
private saving. In Latin America, by contrast, lower private saving caused a sharp fall in
national saving in the 1980s. IMF (1995) finds that most of the rise in world real interest
rates between 1960-72 and 1981-93 can be ascribed to lower government net saving and
higher public debt in the industrial countries and estimates that the resulting fall in capital
formation has led to a permanent loss equivalent to 2 per cent of world consumption.
16  See also Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei (1995) who agree that there is a positive correlation
between savings and growth across a broad range of countries, but argue that the causality is
unclear. There is also cross-country evidence of a non-linear relationship between national
savings rates and per capita income levels, with savings rates very low in countries with per
capita income near the subsistence level, sharply higher for middle-income developing
countries and then about the same or lower for high-income industrial countries.
17  Recent estimates of Ricardian equivalence find that about one-half of a fall on government
saving is offset by higher private saving (IMF 1995;  Edwards 1995; Masson et al. 1995).22
significant changes in the composition of private saving. In 7 of the
10 countries shown in the table, enterprise saving has tended to decline, while
household saving has strengthened, in some cases quite significantly. Of the
three remaining countries, only Australia and France show declines in the rate
of household saving, possibly suggesting that in these two countries household
saving is particularly sensitive to the different cyclical conditions of the 1960s
and the 1990s or disincentives to household saving have become stronger.
The fall in government saving being the dominant influence in virtually all countries
points to fiscal consolidation as the crucial policy measure to raise national saving,
rather than, for example, special incentives to boost private saving. 18 Note, however,
that the recent weakening of national saving appears to be a reversion towards
longer-term ‘norms’ after an unusual postwar boom in saving. As can be seen from
Table 5, the 1950-73 period was not only an unusual period with respect to growth
but also with respect to gross national saving. In fact, the only country with a
relatively smooth pattern of saving is the United  States which, as noted earlier, also
had a relatively smooth pattern of growth.
18  Australia is an exception to this general rule, with the figures in Table 4 understating the
deterioration in household saving. From its peak in the early 1970s, household saving relative
to GDP has fallen by almost 7 percentage points.23
Table 5: Saving and Growth Over Longer Periods in
Selected Countries
Countries 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1989
S/Y g S/Y g S/Y g S/Y g
Australia 12.1 0.9 12.8 0.7 24.4 2.4 22.0 1.7
Canada 10.7 2.3 16.2 1.5 22.5 2.9 21.5 2.5
United Kingdom 13.7 1.0 6.3 0.8 17.9 2.5 19.2 1.8
United States 18.7 2.0 16.5 1.6 19.7 2.2 18.0 1.6
Japan 12.3 1.4 18.7 0.9 32.8 8.0 32.9 3.1
Note:  S/Y = Ratio of gross national saving to GDP, in percentages and  g = per capita GDP growth, in
per cent per annum.
Source: Maddison (1992).
3.3.5 Exchange rate policies
One of Fischer’s conditions for growth-conducive  macroeconomic policies is that
the exchange rate must be competitive and predictable. Very little empirical work
has been done, however, on the relationship between exchange rates and economic
growth, especially for the industrial countries. It has proven very difficult to identify
equilibrium values for real exchange rates, making it almost impossible to quantify
the extent to which they were over or under-valued compared to equilibrium.
Further, while there is some evidence that large and persistent movements in real
exchange rates affect short-run growth, very few studies have looked into the
medium-term implications, partly because exchange rates have started to reverse
before possible effects could be detected.
For developing countries, there is more evidence of exchange rate policies
influencing growth rates. One variable frequently included in cross-country growth
regressions is the differential between the official and the ‘black market’ exchange
rate and in most cases there is significant evidence that maintaining an overvalued
official exchange rate tends to reduce long-run growth.
Additional support for  Fischer’s condition may be obtained by comparing the
experience of Asian countries with those of Africa and Latin America. Though
exchange rate policies in Asia range from a currency board arrangement
(Hong Kong) to various versions of pegging (Thailand), managed floats (Singapore)24
and a flexible rate (the Philippines) a number of countries have used exchange rate
policies to promote export growth. As a result, real exchange rates have mostly been
stable and tended to be undervalued. By contrast, Latin American countries have
frequently relied on a fixed nominal exchange rate against the US$ or a slowly
crawling peg as a means of reducing inflation. However, because other policies
(notably fiscal policy) were not consistent with this target and  indexation created a
high degree of inertia, the rate of inflation exceeded that of the anchor country,
resulting in appreciating real exchange rates and adverse effects for export growth
and the development of the manufacturing sector. A similar experience, though at
much lower rates of inflation and mainly affecting agriculture and resource-based
industries, has already been noted for the members of the African franc zone.
While these comparisons do not yield definitive conclusions, they do suggest that
countries have some medium-term influence on their exchange rates and that
exchange rate policies have potential growth effects. Promotion of international
competitiveness and exports of manufactured goods was part of the ‘Asian growth
strategy’ and keeping the exchange rate slightly undervalued was an important
instrument in this strategy. In Latin America and Africa, on the other hand,
exchange rates have not been used to promote exports and growth but as a means to
reducing inflation. Moreover, because these policies did not succeed in sufficiently
reducing inflation and eventually failed in most cases, exchange rates have tended to
be overvalued for long periods, with detrimental effects for exports and for
aggregate growth.
3.3.6 Financial markets and financial systems
Financial market developments is another area where it has proven difficult to
identify a clear relationship between policy-related variables and growth. For many
years, this has been an area of intensive research efforts but also controversy. Early
works (McKinnon 1973;  Shaw 1973) suggested rather large potential growth
impacts on the assumption that liberalising repressed systems would boost aggregate
saving. This link, however, has found little empirical support, whereas alternative
models focusing on the impact that financial  liberalisation might have on the
allocation of capital and the efficiency and cost of financial  intermediation seem
more consistent with the experience of liberalising countries25
(Lee 1991; Pagano 1993).19 Nonetheless, many have remained sceptical, pointing to
the financial crises often following  liberalisation (Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989) or
arguing that there is no role for finance or the cost of finance in neoclassical growth
models (Lucas 1988).
More recently, new approaches based on endogenous growth models have been
developed, stressing the role of financial systems in gathering information,
evaluating innovative entrepreneurs and pooling financial resources to make
successful innovations operational.  Galetovic (1994) and King and  Levine (1993)
are two examples of this new approach and the latter test the empirical validity of
their model on cross-country data, using four alternative indicators of financial
activity and the depth of private financial markets. All four indicators are based on
money and credit aggregates and appear to be robust when included in the cross-
country regressions discussed in Section 4.
Nonetheless, this evidence should be considered with some caution. First, the
indicators used are rather crude approximations to the services provided by modern
financial systems. Second, the potential role of interest rates remains a puzzle. In
Galetovic’s model, a principal function of financial intermediaries is to reduce the
costs of credit, but in most empirical estimates nominal and real interest rates are
statistically insignificant. Third, when confining the cross -country regressions to
OECD countries, Englander and Gurney (1994) find no effects of financial variables
on productivity growth, suggesting that the four variables proposed by King and
Levine are not the appropriate indicators for industrial countries or that the impact
of financial systems on growth becomes less important beyond a certain level of
economic development (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1995). Finally, while in theory
financial deregulation should improve long-run efficiency, a typical feature of
liberalising countries (industrial as well as developing) is that private sector saving
has declined in step with the greater availability of credit. In several industrial
countries,  liberalisation of financial systems in the 1980s also led to asset price
bubbles with severe and long-lasting repercussions for the financial system and for
private sector balance sheets.
19  Pagano identifies three channels through which financial market  liberalisation can raise
growth: more efficient investment, a less costly transmission and  intermediation process and
higher saving. The empirical evidence clearly points to the first channel as the most important
one whereas changes in the savings ratio have mostly had a negative effect and the impact of
improvements in the transmission process is uncertain.26
The empirical implementation of models of financial developments based on new
theories of growth is still in its infancy and until indicators which better capture the
underlying models have been constructed, it is difficult to draw any firm
conclusions. It does appear, however, that financial markets are neither an ‘engine
of growth’ nor are they purely passive. In the early phase of development, strong
growth would be difficult to achieve unless it is supplemented by rapid development
of the financial system, in particular intermediated finance, and at a later stage
information gathering, pooling of financial resources and diversification of risks are
important in promoting innovation and technical progress. Moreover, liberalised
financial systems promote a more efficient distribution of capital and may enhance
policy efficiency in general. On the other hand, moving from a regulated to a
deregulated environment, when more fundamental factors such as a high
investment/GDP ratio, low budget deficits and low inflation are absent, can have
long-lasting and negative effects on growth.
3.3.7 Path dependence and macroeconomic policies
If, for some reason, the long-run or steady-state growth rate depends on the past
history of actual growth, the scope for  macroeconomic policies to influence growth
widens: a policy mistake causing a recession in one year will have long -lasting and
adverse effects on future growth while, conversely, policy measures that smoothly
offset shocks will keep the economy on a higher growth path than it otherwise
would have been. Whatever the source, the notion of path dependence creates an
important link between short-term demand management policies and long-run output
and is a challenge to those versions of the natural -rate hypothesis which postulate
that policies have no long-run effect on output.
It is, of course, well known that productivity growth changes  within the cycle, but
there may also be effects on the medium-term evolution of productivity. Internal
funds for investment are more readily available during booms than in recessions and
banks are probably more willing to finance investment projects, especially those
with high risks and high potential returns. At relatively low rates of unemployment,
resistance to technological change may be lower than in periods when workers fear
that labour productivity gains add further to the number of unemployed. On the
other hand, recessions increase the pressure to improve efficiency and may be
necessary to ‘clean out’ inefficient firms ( Schumpeter 1939). Moreover, even if
faster output growth has a positive net effect on productivity, there are clearly limits27
to how much can be gained, as an aggressive policy of ‘going for growth’ inevitably
pushes up inflation.
The impressive growth performance after World War II, compared to the
pre-Depression era, is attributed by some to a combination of path dependence,
automatic fiscal stabilisers and macro-policy activism. Pre-eminent proponents of
this view, De Long and Summers (1988), show that  expansionary nominal demand
shocks appear to have more effect on prices and less on output than  contractionary
shocks, and they point to a marked rise in output persistence and a significant
decline in the average output gap in the post-war period, which they interpret as a
consequence of successful counter-cyclical macro-policies after World War II.
While De Long and Summers probably go too far in their positive appraisal of
demand management policies (Mankiw 1988) the asymmetric response to positive
and negative nominal shocks they report supports the perception of most
policy-makers who, having experienced the large output costs associated with
reversing inflationary forces, have become more aware of the need to avoid excess
demand pressures. It has also recently been supported by an analysis of the trade-off
between inflation and the output-gap for the G7 countries.  Laxton, Meredith and
Rose (1995) find that a positive demand shock in an initial situation of zero excess
demand leads to a rise in inflation of more than 1 1/2 percentage points while a
negative shock of the same size reduces inflation by less than  a 1/2 of a percentage
point. As a consequence of this asymmetric response, the average  level of trend
output is raised when the variability of output is lowered.20
Some simple policy prescriptions flow from these empirical results. First, when the
trade-off is asymmetric and policy makers are faced with the risk of a permanent
rise in inflation, prompt policy responses reduce the output costs of keeping inflation
low and thus raise the long-run output level compared with a strategy of lagged and
largely ex post interventions. In other words, the existence of an asymmetric trade-
off supports the use of a pre-emptive policy strategy.
20  This is a general feature of a convex aggregate supply or Phillips curve (Mankiw 1988). In
the Laxton et al. specification, potential output, at which inflation is steady, exceeds  average
trend output. The difference rises with the variance of output growth, and has averaged
about half a per cent for the G7 countries.28
The second prescription also arises from the relationship between output variability
and the long-run output level. Because of the numerous shocks to which an
economy is exposed, there is a policy trade-off between minimising fluctuations in
output from its potential and inflation from its target ( Taylor 1992;  Debelle and
Stevens 1995). A policy strategy aimed at always keeping inflation close to its
target and restoring price stability quickly after a shock generates larger fluctuations
in output and thus lowers the long-run output level. By contrast, provided
medium-term inflation remains close to the target, policy-makers tolerating
short-term deviations from this inflation target can reduce output fluctuations and
thereby increase the long-run output level. Assuming that credibility is not adversely
affected, some tolerance in meeting the inflation target is thus likely to have a
favourable impact on long-run output, compared with a more rigorous strategy
which only allows deviations in the case of major supply shocks.
4. INFLATION AND GROWTH
‘Economic analysis of the costs of inflation – the mirror image of the benefits of
price stability – is inevitably disappointing to the many ... who know that inflation is
a deep societal problem. The question is whether what the many know is merely
difficult to prove, or rather is substantially exaggerated’ ( Fischer 1984, p. 33).
Given the crucial role of monetary policy in determining the inflation rate in the
longer run, it is important when discussing macro-policies and growth, to understand
the relationship between inflation and growth. This section examines this
relationship.
Of the myriad ways in which inflation reduces economic efficiency (summarised, for
example, by Fischer and Modigliani (1978) and  Briault (1995)) there are three of
particular relevance for economic growth. First, even anticipated inflation distorts
the intertemporal allocation of resources as higher nominal interest rates interact
with the tax system to affect saving and investment. Second, unanticipated inflation
generates greater uncertainty about future inflation, discouraging long -term
contracting and raising risk  premia on interest rates, which in turn inhibits
investment. Third, because higher inflation is associated with larger relative price
variability, price signals become more difficult to interpret and the sectoral
allocation of resources is adversely affected.29
While theoretical calculations have been made of some of the costs of inflation,
much discussion is based on simple intuition rather than explicit theoretical
formulations. Despite increasingly sophisticated attempts (see, for example, Black,
Macklem and Poloz (1994)) it is still very difficult to provide theoretical analysis of
many of the economic consequences of inflation. Again quoting  Fischer (1984,
pp. 45-46), speaking with some exasperation at this lack of progress:
‘Surely inflation is associated with ... more weighty matters than money triangles
and the efficiency of the price system.’
With theory providing little guidance on how the effects of inflation should be
included in models of economic growth, most empirical studies simply add average
inflation, and/or its standard deviation, to otherwise standard cross -country growth
regressions. In discussing the evidence that emerges from these studies, we begin
with the influential contributions of  Levine and  Renelt (1992) and  Levine and
Zervos (1993), henceforth LR and LZ.
In motivating their study, LR review the huge literature using cross -country
regressions to search for empirical links between long-run growth and a variety of
economic policy, political and institutional factors suggested by theory. They list
40 cross-sectional studies published between 1980 and 1990, each regressing the
growth rate over a given period against a variety of variables. In all,  over
50 variables have been found to be significant  explanators of growth in at least one
regression. As it is hard to believe that all these variables are important for growth,
LR and LZ propose a strict test of the robustness of these regressions, based on
Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds analysis.
LR and LZ consider regressions of the form:
Dq = biI + bm M + bz Z+ u (2)
where Dq is per capita GDP growth, I is a set of variables always included in the
regression, M is the variable of interest and  Z is a subset from a pool of variables
identified in past studies as potentially important  explanators of growth. Their
analysis involves first running a ‘base’ regression including the  I-variables on their
own. Then the variable of interest,  M, and all possible combinations of up to three
Z-variables are added to the regression. If the coefficient estimate  bm remains of
the same sign and significant at a 0.05 level  in all these regressions, then the30
variable  M is described by LR and LZ as a ‘robust’ explanatory variable for
economic growth. Alternatively, if the coefficient   bm changes sign or becomes
insignificant in any regression,  M is a ‘fragile’ explanator for economic growth. As
this description makes clear, this is a very strict test of the robustness of the
variable, M, as an explanatory variable for economic growth.
LR and LZ differ in their choice of  I-variables for their base regressions. Both
studies include initial secondary school enrolment as a proxy for initial human
capital. They both also include initial real GDP per capita to allow for
‘convergence’: the fact highlighted by Dowrick (1995) that, other things equal, poor
countries grow faster than rich ones. The LR base regression also includes
population growth and the average investment share of GDP while the LZ base
regression includes the average number of revolutions and coups over the sample
period.21
For the purpose of examining the empirical relationship between inflation and
growth, both base regressions are of interest. Inflation may plausibly affect
economic growth by both altering the level of investment as well as affecting the
efficiency of resource allocation. Adding inflation to the LR base regression,
therefore, tests whether inflation affects economic growth after controlling for the
level of investment. Alternatively, adding inflation to the LZ base regression tests
whether inflation affects growth including its effect on the level of investment as one
of its channels of influence.
Both LR and LZ conclude that inflation is a fragile explanatory variable for
economic growth. They both find that average inflation (or its standard deviation)
makes a statistically insignificant contribution to their base regressions. It should be
noted, however, that these conclusions are based on regressions for about one
hundred countries with average annual inflation rates over their estimation period,
1960-89, ranging from less than 3 per cent (for Ethiopia!) to 474 per cent for
Bolivia.
In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between inflation and growth for
countries like Australia with similar (advanced) industrial structures, and with
21  Barro (1991) shows that the average number of revolutions and coups helps explain
economic growth in a broad cross-section of countries.31
comparable rates of inflation. We therefore apply the LR-LZ approach to examine
the empirical link between inflation and growth for OECD economies with
comparable inflation rates. We repeat the LR-LZ approach as closely as possible,
thereby limiting the problem of data-mining: that is, of choosing among a large
number of theoretically plausible specifications, the one that provides the strongest
support for the story one is trying to tell.
It is often argued that fully-anticipated inflation impo ses less economic costs than
uncertainty about future inflation, and hence that the variability of inflation may be a
better summary measure of the effects of inflation on growth than the average
inflation rate. However, as Figure 3 shows for the OECD, there is a close
correlation between average inflation and the variability of inflation (as  measured by
the standard deviation of inflation). 22 As a consequence of this correlation, it is a
daunting empirical task to identify the effect on growth of the level and variability of
inflation separately. In the empirical exercise to follow, we limit our analysis to
examining the relationship between growth and average inflation, recognising that
some of the effect on growth of higher average inflation may be a consequence of
the fact that high inflation is also more variable inflation.
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between economic growth and
average inflation for the 24 OECD countries over the period 1960-89. As previously
mentioned, Iceland and Turkey are clear outliers, each with average annual inflation
of 28 per cent, while the other 22 OECD countries had average annual inflation
rates between 4 and 12 per cent (with Australian inflation averaging 7  per cent).
22  The figure is from  Edey (1994). Iceland and Turkey have much higher and more variable
inflation than the rest of the OECD and are not shown. As discussed in  Briault (1995), a
large standard deviation does not necessarily imply more uncertainty if the process generating
inflation variability is known. However, alternative measures of uncertainty, constructed from
surveys or econometric models, also show a close correlation with the average rate of
inflation.32
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There is some evidence that the association between average inflation and growth
weakens as inflation rises.23 To minimise the influence of this effect on our
regressions, we therefore exclude Iceland and Turkey from the analysis. (However,
the Appendix reports regressions using the whole OECD sample.)
We now apply the LR-LZ approach to the 22 ‘low-inflation’ OECD countries rather
than the hundred countries used by them. The dependent variable is always average
annual per capita GDP growth, though the explanatory variables for the LR and LZ
base regressions are different, as discussed above. After estimating the base
regression, we add the variable of interest, the average inflation rate (measured
using the GDP  deflator), and then up to three  Z-variables to the regression. The
base regressions and  Z-variables are reported in the Appendix while Table 6
summarises the coefficient estimates on inflation for all 30  regressions.24
The estimated coefficient on inflation is negative for all thirty regressions (that is,
higher inflation is associated with lower growth). 25 In about half the regressions, this
negative estimate is statistically significant at a 5 per cent level, while in the other
half, it is statistically insignificant. Using the definition introduced by LR and LZ,
average inflation is, therefore, a fragile  explanator of economic growth.
23  See Fischer (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1993). Wright (1994) finds that while average
inflation (PI) makes an insignificant negative contribution to growth in the LZ base
regression, log(PI) makes a significant negative contribution – which also supports the point.
By contrast, Barro (1995) argues that the relationship between growth and inflation is linear.
24  The data are from the database used by King and Levine (1993) and were kindly supplied to
us by Steve Dowrick. We use four Z-variables for both LR and LZ sets of regressions. Each
set therefore includes one regression adding the average inflation rate to the base regression,
four regressions adding one  Z-variable to this regression, six adding two  Z-variables, and
four adding three  Z-variables, for a total of 15 regressions. Estimation is by OLS with
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. A coefficient estimate of -0.1, for example,
implies that a fall in average inflation of 1 percentage point is associated with a rise in
per capita GDP growth of 0.1 percentage points per annum.
25  This result seems in contrast with Figure 4 which suggests a slightly  positive relationship
between inflation and economic growth. This positive relationship occurs primarily because
countries with low initial GDP tend to grow faster but also to have higher inflation.
Controlling for initial GDP, the regressions suggest the relationship between inflation and
growth is, in fact, negative.34
Table 6: The Effect of Inflation on Growth for OECD Countries
(1960-1989)
Coefficient on inflation in growth regressions
Regression Significant Significant Insiginificant Total
type coefficients coefficients coefficients
5% 10%
Average No. Average No. Average No. Average
No.
  value   value   value   value
LR -0.16 6 -0.15 5 -0.10 4 -0.14 15
LZ -0.17 10 -0.14 3 -0.10 2 -0.15 15
A possible shortcoming of this cross-country analysis arises from the effect of
supply shocks. Adverse supply shocks reduce output and raise inflation leading to a
negative correlation between inflation and growth even when higher inflation has
not caused lower growth. The cross-country regressions reported in Table 6 may
perhaps be picking up the fact that some industrial countries suffered worse
aggregate supply shocks than others, and hence had both lower output growth and
higher inflation over the estimation period. Since the obvious adverse supply
shocks, OPEC I and II, affected inflation and growth after 1973, we split the sample
in 1973 and examine the growth experiences 1960-73 and 1974-89 separately. 26
Table 7 summarises coefficient estimates on inflation for the two sub -samples. As
the table makes clear, coefficient estimates derived for the sub-samples are less
statistically significant than for the whole sample. It is also clear that the coefficient
estimates on inflation are usually smaller in magnitude when estimated over 1960-73
than over 1974-89 or over the whole sample, 1960-89. This supports the earlier
suggestion that some of the negative correlation between inflation and growth over
the whole sample arises from the differential impact of adverse supply shocks. 27
26  For consistency, in each sub-sample, we excluded from analysis all countries with an annual
average inflation rate greater than 20 per cent. For the first sub-sample, 1960-73, all 24
OECD countries were included (Turkey and Iceland had average annual inflation rates of 11
and 16 per cent, respectively) while for the second, Iceland and Turkey were excluded.
27  Another potential shortcoming of the analysis (suggested to us by John  Quiggin) arises from
possible  mis-allocation of nominal GDP growth into real GDP growth and inflation
(measured using the GDP deflator). For given nominal GDP growth, under-estimation of real35
Table 7: The Effect of Inflation on Growth for OECD Countries by
Sub-periods (1960-1973 and 1974-1989)








Average value No. Average value No. Average value No.
LR 60:73 -0.04 11 -0.08 4 -0.05 15
LZ 60:73 -0.06 8 — — -0.06 8(a)
LR 74:89 — — -0.09 15 -0.09 15
LZ 74:89 -0.10 7 -0.11 1 -0.10 8(a)
Note: (a) One of the conditioning variables in the LZ regressions is not available for the sub-periods
       (see the Appendix).
The overwhelming impression from the regressions reported in Tables 6 and 7 is
that, after controlling for a range of other potentially relevant  explanators, higher
average inflation is correlated with lower average economic growth. Of the
76 regressions reported in the two tables, all but one give negative point estimates
for the effect of inflation on growth. Furthermore, this conclusion should be of
relevance for industrial countries like Australia since it is derived for OECD
countries with average inflation rates less than 20 per cent per annum.
Not surprisingly, given the importance of the issue, the literature contains a large
number of empirical studies estimating the effect of inflation on growth. Table  8
summarises the recent evidence, based primarily on cross-country studies for
OECD economies in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The table reports only the most
relevant of the many regression specifications presented in each study. While the
regressions reported are not all independent of each other, there is at least some
variation in sample periods and in the explanatory variables used. Given the
problems of adverse supply shocks discussed above, the table also reports some
results for samples which end before OPEC I.
                                                                                                                                                      
GDP growth implies over-estimation of inflation and vice versa. If the extent and direction of
mis-measurement is the same in each country, the analysis is not invalidated. If  mis-
measurement varies between countries, however, a spurious negative correlation is generated
between measured growth and inflation. We therefore repeated the analysis using consumer
price inflation which reduces this measurement problem. The coefficient estimates on CPI
inflation are almost all negative and similar in magnitude to those reported in Tables 6 and 7.
They are, however, much less statistically significant.36
Table 8: Cross-Country Studies of the Relationship Between
Inflation and Growth
(Dependent variable: real GDP growth or per capita real GDP growth in
per cent per annum)





Grier and Tullock (1989)(a) 1951-80 Panel 24 OECD
countries
0.01 0.2
Grimes (1991) 1961-87 Panel 21 OECD
countries
-0.11 9.2


































Fischer (1993)(c) 1961-88 Panel Non-oil -0.13 2.0
1961-72 Panel countries -0.20 3.4
Englander and Gurney
(1994)(d)
1960s-90 Panel 19 OECD
countries
-0.06 1.6








Notes: (a) The reported regression also includes the standard deviation of inflation,  SDPI, with a statistically 
significant negative coefficient. As  PI and SDPI are highly correlated, the coefficient on  PI is 
very imprecisely estimated.
(b) Average inflation, PI, enters this growth regression as log(PI). The coefficient estimate, -0.13, is the 
estimated effect on growth of a one percentage point rise in inflation at the sample mean inflation
rate,  7.7 per cent per annum (derived from their Table 12).
(c) Results are from two of the many regressions reported (equations (36) and (48)). The former 
allows the effect of inflation on growth to depend on the inflation rate, and we report the co efficient 
for inflation less than 15 per cent per annum. The latter truncates the sample before OPEC I.
(d) The dependent variable is growth in output per employee in the business sector.37
(e) Results are from two of several regressions reported. The former assumes the coefficient is 
independent of the inflation rate. The latter allows the effect of inflation on growth to depend on the 
inflation rate, and we again report the coefficient for inflation less than 15 per cent per  annum.
As Table 8 makes clear, there is professional disagreement about the statistical
significance of the relationship between inflation and growth. Some studies
(for example  Kyriakopoulos (1991), LR, LZ,  Clark (1993) and Englander and
Gurney (1994) conclude that the relationship between inflation and growth is either
statistically insignificant at conventional levels of significance or fragile. Others
(such as Grimes (1991),  Cozier and  Selody (1992),  Fischer (1993) and
Motley (1993)) argue that there is indeed a significant relationship, with higher
inflation correlated with lower growth.
Despite this disagreement about statistical significance, it is striking that the vast
majority of growth regressions in the literature report negative coefficient estimates
on inflation. This is of course true of those studies that find a significant negative
relationship between inflation and growth. It is also true, however, of the vast
majority of studies that conclude that the relationship is statistically insignificant
(see Table 8). For example, LZ report eight different specifications for their
cross-country inflation-growth regressions. While the coefficient on inflation in
these regressions is sometimes statistically significant and sometimes not – indeed,
that is LZ’s point – the coefficient is always negative.
While the results are not as robust as one would like, the most obvious
interpretation of the evidence in Tables 6 to 8 is that the negative correlation
between inflation and growth arises from a causal relationship. That is, other things
equal, lower inflation leads to higher economic growth. (A possible alternative
interpretation is that countries with low inflation also tend to have a range of
growth-enhancing policies, due to a consensus about the benefits of economic
growth. While the analysis attempts to control for the effect of other policies, one
might argue that the measures it uses – budget surplus, ratio of trade to GDP, etc. –
are too imprecise to capture the benefits of a general community commitment to
growth.)
Nonetheless, accepting the interpretation that inflation has a causal impact on
growth, it is worth quantifying the estimated gains from lower inflation implied by
the point estimates in the tables. To do so, we assume a plausible value for
per capita output growth (2 per cent per annum) and for the real interest rate used to38
discount future income (5 per cent per annum). Figure 5 then shows the cumulative
gain in per capita output, discounted to the present, from reducing the inflation rate
by one percentage point.
Figure 5: Cumulated Output Gain From Reducing Inflation
By One Percentage Point





























Results are presented for three alternative estimates of the effect of average inflation
on annual growth (-0.025, -0.5 and -0.1), and the figure also shows  Stevens’ (1992)
estimate of the short-run output cost of reducing inflation by one  percentage point,
2.5 per cent of one year’s GDP.
As Figure 5 shows, disinflation is an investment activity: the costs are borne at the
time, while the gains accrue gradually and only outweigh the costs after an extended
period. If the annual growth dividend from a one percentage point fall in inflation is
as small as 0.025 – an estimate smaller in magnitude than most of the estimates in39
Tables 6 to 8 – it takes about 16 years for the discounted cumulated gains from
faster growth to exceed the short-run output costs of achieving lower inflation
(see Figure 5). However, even from such a small growth dividend, the cumulated
gains from faster growth eventually exceed the short-run costs by a substantial
margin. Of course, if the growth dividend from lower inflation is larger, the ‘break-
even’ point occurs earlier and the eventual gains from lower inflation dwarf the
initial costs. Thus, while the estimates in Tables  6 to 8 are sometimes statistically
insignificant, they are of considerable economic significance. Measured over an
extended period, they imply substantial cumulated output gains from lower inflation.
To conclude, it is worth stressing that the available empirical evidence for industrial
countries since World War II, is mute on the issue of whether there are gains from
achieving zero or very low single-digit inflation. There are simply no data on
economies operating with very low inflation for extended periods. The lowest
annual inflation rate in the OECD over the 30 years, 1960-89, was achieved by
Germany with a 4 per cent average. Over the shorter period, 1960-73, the lowest
average annual inflation rate was in the United States, again with 4 per cent, while
over the period, 1974-89, Japan had the lowest inflation with an annual average of
3 per cent. The effect on output growth of achieving average inflation below these
rates is simply unknown.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The industrial world achieved an impressive improvement in long-run growth in the
first generation after World War II. Since then growth has been slower, though it
remains significantly above the rates recorded in the first half of this century. This
slowdown renewed interest in the determinants of long-run growth and the last
decade has witnessed an explosion in both theoretical and empirical studies of
growth. Several analysts have also examined whether there is a role for
macroeconomic policies in explaining the growth performance of the
1950-73 period, the subsequent slowdown and in improving the prospects for future
growth.
This paper has reviewed this new literature, looking at both theoretical and
empirical aspects that may have implications for the design of  macroeconomic
policies. The evidence reported is, to some extent, selective and tentative.
Furthermore, since the principal determinants of growth are factor accumulation and40
technological progress, the impact of macro-policies is probably at the margin.
Nevertheless, on balance, we conclude that macro-policies do make some difference
to long-run growth. We draw the following five broad conclusions from our study.
First, although both neoclassical and endogenous growth models assign a major role
to capital accumulation, policy measures to boost aggregate investment through
special incentives do not seem to be called for. There is little evidence that
aggregate investment yields excess returns, suggesting that the positive  externalities
postulated in some versions of endogenous growth theory are very small at an
economy-wide level. Consequently, the main tasks of policy makers in this area are
to remove existing distortions (especially those favouring investment in property)
and to abstain from reducing public investment in infrastructure merely as a means
of restoring fiscal balance.
Second, in a world of liberalised capital flows, saving acts as a constraint on
investment and growth for the world as a whole but less so for an individual
country, as capital flows from countries with excess saving to those where profitable
investment exceeds domestic saving. Yet, reliance on foreign saving is not costless
as countries with growing external liabilities face higher real interest rates, a
depreciating real exchange rate, and perhaps, a higher degree of economic
uncertainty. Ultimately, capital inflows are limited to the rate the market accepts as
sustainable, which for a country like Australia, with abundant natural resources and
a stable political environment, may be higher than for many other capital importing
countries.
Third, in many industrial countries, declining national saving rates are primarily a
consequence of lower government saving, suggesting the need for reduced fiscal
imbalances. In Australia, private savings have also fallen substantially, suggesting a
role for specific incentives to boost this component of savings. There is also some
evidence that the causation between higher national saving and faster growth may
run both ways. While many cross-country regressions identify the saving rate as one
of the principal growth determinants, several recent studies suggest that faster
growth also leads, with some lag, to a higher saving rate.
Fourth, recent evidence suggests that when economies are near potential output, the
short-run trade-off between inflation and the output gap is asymmetric, with
short-run rises in output  being more inflationary than falls in output are41
disinflationary. If this is the case, it opens a channel by which macro-policy can
influence the level of long-run output. This has two implications. The first is that a
policy strategy that acts pre-emptively to counter expected future demand pressures
and quickly mitigates the effects of unexpected shocks has a positive effect on the
level of output, compared with a more hesitant approach which acts only when the
demand pressures have appeared. Second, provided inflation is kept close to its
target in the medium-term, policy which tolerates some short -term deviations of
inflation from its target can reduce fluctuations in real output and thereby generate a
higher long-run output level than a policy with the sole goal of keeping inflation
close to its target.
Fifth, because monetary policy determines inflation in the long run, a key role of
monetary policy in influencing growth depends on the relationship between inflation
and growth. Although most economists believe even moderate rates of inflation
adversely affect growth, unambiguous evidence has been difficult to come by. While
there is still professional disagreement on the robustness of the empirical evidence,
it does appear that higher inflation, and the associated increased uncertainty about
future inflation, adversely affects growth in the industrial countries. Moreover, the
gains from lower inflation appear to exceed the initial costs of reducing inflation
within about a decade.42
APPENDIX A: INFLUENCES ON GROWTH
A1. The Persistence of Growth Rates and the Determinants of  Growth
As briefly discussed in the text, while levels of output have a high degree of
persistence, for most countries, growth is not very persistent. The correlation
between average growth rates in the 1960s and in the 1970s is as low as 0.15 for
89 non-oil countries and only slightly higher (0.3) when the same calculation is done
for the 1970s and 1980s (Easterly et al. 1993). By contrast, country characteristics,
including many policy related variables used in most cross -country regressions, are
highly persistent.
We have explored this problem further for the OECD countries (excluding Iceland
and Turkey) in Table A1 by regressing average growth for 5-year periods over
subsequent 5-year periods. Panel (a) of the table shows that out of 21 correlation
coefficients only 4 are significant, with the highest being the one for the two
sub-periods of the 1960s. By contrast, as panels (b) to (d) show, inflation as well as
general government deficits and investment (both as ratios to GDP) exhibit much
more persistence than growth. For investment, even ratios 30  years apart yield a
coefficient of almost 0.5. For inflation, the effect of the two oil shocks is clearly
evident while the degree of persistence strengthens considerably for the more recent
years when inflation declined. Budget deficits, on the other hand, have become less
persistent in recent years, probably reflecting countries’ differential success in
consolidating their fiscal positions.
What is the relevance of these results for the link between policies and growth?
First, country characteristics are not the only determinants of growth; as
Easterly et al. conclude, a substantial part of the variation in growth arises from
shocks, in particular terms-of-trade shocks. Second, one interpretation of the results
is that country characteristics mainly serve to explain relative per capita income
levels while growth rates are more dependent on shocks, and are therefore more
variable. Nonetheless, policies can still have a significant influence on growth,
especially when countries are far from their steady-state income levels. Third, while
shocks are important in explaining growth, policy reactions to the shocks influence
how growth is affected. For instance, when comparing the coefficients in Table A1
for the two oil shocks, it is noticeable that following the first oil shock (1965/70 to
1970/75) the correlation for GDP growth remained at a relatively high 0.43 while43
for inflation the correlation fell to 0.31. By contrast, between 1975/80 and 1980/85
the correlation for GDP growth declined to only 0.01; inflation, on the other hand,
remained highly persistent because most countries tightened monetary policy to
prevent the second oil shock from pushing up inflation.
Table A1: Indicators of Persistence for 22 OECD Countries
1965/70 1970/75 1975/80 1980/85 1985/90 1990/95
(a) GDP growth
1960/65 .74* .30 .19 .02 .14 .26
1965/70 .43 .52* .12 .50* .08
1970/75 .28 .48* .39 .28




1960/65 .50* .45** .01 .15 .31 .12
1965/70 .31 .06 .23 .31 .43
1970/75 .69* .50* .35 .32
1975/80 .85* .85* .52*
1980/85 .87* .72*
1985/90 .82*
(c) General government deficit/GDP
1960/65 .83* .73* .71* .60* .46 .01
1965/70 .83* .75* .48** .50* .01
1970/75 .78* .56* .41 .03
1975/80 .59* .35 .00
1980/85 .56* .18
1985/90 .38
1960 1970 1980 1990
(d) Investment/GDP
1960 .78* .57* .48**
1970 .73* .66*
1980 .64*
Note: The numbers shown in panels (a) and (b) are correlation coefficients between average rates of respectively
real GDP growth and inflation for the five -year periods in the first column and the subsequent five -year
periods given in the first row. Similarly the numbers in panels (c) and (d) are correlation coefficients
between respectively government deficit and investment/GDP ratios for the periods or years shown in the
first column and the periods or years given in the first row. * and ** indicate respectively 99 and
95 per cent levels of significance.44
A2. Growth and Balance of Payments
The McCombie and Thirlwall model
To derive their balance-of-payments consistent growth rate,  McCombie and
Thirlwall (1994) [MT] start from the balance-of-payments identity:
Pd X + F = PfEM (3)
where: Pd is export prices in domestic currency;
Pf is import prices in foreign currency;
X is exports of goods and services (in volumes);
M is imports of goods and services (in volumes);
E is the exchange rate (measured as domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency); and
F is the capital account balance.
No distinction is made between export prices and domestic prices, which implies
that the real effective exchange rate is identical to the terms of trade.
Export and import volumes depend on income and relative prices as follows:
M = PfE/ P d ( )
y
Yp
X = P d / PfE ( )
h
Ze (4)
where: y = demand elasticity of imports with respect to relative price of imports;
 h = demand elasticity of exports with respect to relative price of exports;
 p = elasticity of imports with respect to domestic income (Y); and
 e = elasticity of exports with respect to foreign income (Z).
Taking rates of change, denoted by small letters, (4) becomes:
m =y pf +e- pd ( )+py
x = h pd - e- pf ( )+ ez (5)45
Similarly, equation (3) can be rewritten in rates of change:
q pd + x ( )+ 1-q ( )f = pf + m +e (6)
where q denotes the proportion of import expenditure met by export earnings. Then
inserting (5) into (6), the balance-of-payments constrained growth rate can be
written as:
y* = qh+y ( ) pd -e- pf ( )+ pd - e- pf ( )+qez + 1-q ( ) f - pd ( ) [ ] /p (7)
where the first term on the right-hand side measures the trade volume effects of
relative price changes and will be positive for a real depreciation (or terms-of-trade
deterioration); the second term the income effect of terms-of-trade changes; the third
term the effect of export growth; and the last term the effect of capital flows
(measured in constant prices) which is positive in case of inflows. The sum of the
four terms determines total revenue available for expanding imports and the
corresponding growth of income is then derived by dividing by the income elasticity
of imports.
To provide estimates of  y* for Australia within the MT framework, two specific
problems need to be addressed. First, how should capital inflows be defined and
measured? One possibility is to include only those flows (for instance, foreign direct
investment, equity portfolio inflows and long-term debt inflows contracted by the
private sector) that are mainly attracted by prospective returns in the Australian
private economy.28 Alternatively, one can ignore capital inflows in the calculation of
y* and leave them for an  ex post evaluation in the event that actual output growth
deviates from y*. A second issue is the treatment of net income and transfers, which
are not included in  MT’s measure of revenue available for imports but would
significantly affect  y* if they do not remain constant. To generate our results, we
include changes in capital inflows only as a memorandum item, and subtract the
growth of net income payments to abroad from the growth of export earnings, with a
weight corresponding to their share of total export revenue. With these assumptions,
Table A2 shows our estimates, using average figures for 1959/60-1993/94 and the
shorter period 1972/73-1989/90.
28  As noted in IMF (1995), countries with abundant natural resources tend to have large and
sustained capital inflows. Higher labour-force growth should have a similar effect.46
Table A2: Growth and the Balance of Payments: Australia
(Percentage per annum, unless otherwise indicated)
Variables Actual and estimated values:
1959/60-1993/94 1972/73-1989/90
Growth in net income payments to abroad 6.5 8.3
Change in the terms of trade -0.5 0.6
Growth in export volumes 6.0 4.5
Adjusted export growth(a) 4.50 – 5.00 3.25 – 4.00
Balance-of-payments constrained GDP growth (b) 2.75 – 3.05 2.00 – 2.45
Actual GDP growth 3.7 3.1
Change in capital inflows: as per cent of GDP 1.0 5.1
Notes: (a)  Obtained from equation (5) by subtracting the weighted growth of net income payments (weight =
the  share of net income in total export revenue) and the combined effect on income and trade volumes of
terms of trade changes, allowing for two extreme cases: qh+ y + 1 = 0 (i.e. no adjustment to export 
growth) and qh + y = 0 (i.e. export growth adjusted for the full terms-of-trade change).
(b)  In calculating y*, it is assumed that the proportion of import expenditure met by export earnings,  q, 
is 0.95 while the income elasticity of imports,  p, is 1.55, from Dwyer and Kent (1993).
The implications of rising external liabilities
To derive the results in the text, we use the following empirical ingredients. First,
the Blundell-Wignall  et al. (1993) equation for the Australian real exchange rate,
when re-estimated over the period 1984:1 to 1994:4, implies that a one percentage
point rise in the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP is associated with a real
depreciation of 0.5 per cent.
Second, the relationship between net external liabilities ( NEL) in years t and t+1
and the current account deficit (CAD) in year t is given by  NELt+1=NELt+CADt.
Dividing throughout by  GDP and letting lower-case letters denote ratios to  GDP
gives:
1+ g ( )nelt+1 = nelt + cadt (8)
where g is nominal GDP growth per annum. Assuming  g = 0.06, a current account
deficit of 4.5 per cent of GDP (average for the last ten years) and a net external
liabilities to GDP ratio of 45 per cent (the current value) implies that the net external47
liabilities to GDP ratio is rising by 1.7 percentage points per annum, leading to an
average annual real exchange rate depreciation of 0.5  X 1.7 = 0.85 per cent.29
Third, to estimate the inflationary impact of this real exchange rate depreciation, we
rely on the price equation in  Wilkinson and Lam (1995) which explains domestic
prices in the long-run by unit labour costs and import prices, with coefficients 0.7
and 0.3 respectively. In the long run, a 1 percent  nominal depreciation therefore
raises domestic prices by 0.3 per cent and hence translates into a  real depreciation
of  1- 0.3 = 0.7 per cent. It follows that a real depreciation of 0.85 per cent
per annum generates a rise in domestic prices of 0.3  X 0.85 / 0.7 = 0.36 per cent per
annum.
To completely offset the domestic price effect of the real depreciation, real unit
labour costs must fall by 0.3  X 0.85 / 0.7 = 0.36 per cent per annum. With no
explicit mechanism to reduce real unit labour costs, this outcome can only be
achieved by reducing the level of real output. To derive the required reduction, we
use the sacrifice ratio of 2.5 (Stevens 1992). To prevent the real depreciation and
the rise in import prices from pushing up the domestic inflation rate, actual output
must be reduced on average by about 0.9 per cent (0.36 X 2.5).
A3. Inflation and Growth
The LR base regression applied to the 22 low inflation OECD countries is:
Dq = 2.47- 0.35RGDP60-0.20GPO + 0.72SEC +8.18INV (9)
(2.35) (6.13) (0.56) (0.92) (2.43)
(R 2 = 0.61, estimation period 1960-89, absolute value of White robust t-statistics in
parentheses), while the LZ base regression applied to the 22 low inflation
29  The current nel value of 45 per cent is calculated by cumulating current account deficits since
1970. This is the relevant measure for our purposes since we use the  Blundell-Wignall  et al.
estimate of the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to changes in  nel. Note, in passing, that
the effect of a given current account deficit on the change in  nel is inversely related to the
actual size of  nel. On the other hand, the sensitivity of the current external imbalance to
changes in foreign interest rates increases in proportion to  nel. Both relations are relevant to
the notion of a balance of payments constraint, but will not be discussed further.48
OECD countries is:
Dq = 6.03-1.96LRGDP60+ 0.22LSEC -3.32REVC (10)
(6.60) (4.28) (0.71) (1.77)
(R 2 = 0.57, estimation period 1960-89, absolute value of White robust t-statistics in
parentheses).
The variables are average per capita real GDP growth in per cent per annum ( Dq),
per capita real GDP in 1960 (RGDP60), average annual rate of population growth
(GPO), initial secondary school enrolment rate ( SEC), average investment share of
GDP (INV) and the average number of revolutions and coups per year ( REVC).
LRGDP60 and LSEC are log(RGDP60) and log(SEC).
For the set of LR regressions, the Z-variables are: government consumption share of
GDP (GOV), export share of GDP (X), the average number of revolutions and coups
per year (REVC), and the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP ( LLY), while for the set of
LZ regressions, the  Z-variables are: the government fiscal surplus ratio to GDP
(SURY), the ratio of total trade to GDP (TRD), LLY and the black-market exchange
rate premium (BMP).30
Both the LR and LZ base regressions contain statistically insignificant explanatory
variables when estimated for the 22 low inflation OECD countries (see above). We
include these variables in the analysis reported in the text to reproduce the LR-LZ
approach as closely as possible. Nevertheless, to establish that our conclusions
about the correlation between inflation and growth are robust to the exclusion of
these variables, we repeat the analysis for the whole estimation period 1960-89 and
for the sub-period 1960-73, excluding from each base regression any variable with
an absolute t-statistic less than 1.5. This implies that, for the LR whole estimation
period regression, GPO and SEC are excluded, for the LZ whole estimation period
regression,  LSEC is excluded, for the LR 1960-73 regression,  SEC is excluded,
while for the LZ 1960-73 regression, LSEC is excluded.
30  These Z-variables correspond closely to those used by LR and LZ. We added  LLY (one of
the LZ Z-variables) to the list of Z-variables used by LR to generate more regressions. For
the LZ sub-sample regressions, we used GOV instead of SURY, but lacked data on BMP and
so were limited to eight regressions for each sub-sample.49
These modified LR and LZ regressions generate the following results. The
coefficient on average inflation in all 30 regressions estimated over 1960-89 is
negative with point estimates ranging from -0.11 to -0.20, mostly significant at 5  per
cent. For the 15 LR and 8 LZ regressions estimated over the sub-period 1960-73,
the coefficient on average inflation is negative in 20 (out of 23) regressions with
point estimates ranging from -0.09 to +0.01 but always insignificant at a 10 per cent
level. We infer from this exercise that the conclusions drawn in the text about the
inflation-growth relationship are robust to the exclusion of insignificant explanatory
variables from the LR and LZ base regressions.
We also looked for any systematic non-linearity in the relationship between growth
and inflation for our sample, and sub-samples, of OECD countries. To do so, we
added the square of average inflation,  PI2, to each regression in our original
analysis. No systematic results emerged from this exercise, with both the size and
sign of the coefficients on PI and PI2 often changing from one regression to the next.
For completeness, we also report results adding average inflation ( PI) to the LR and
LZ base regressions when the sample includes all 24 OECD countries. The LR
regression is then:
Dq = 2.21- 0.34RGDP60+ 0.23GPO+ 0.87SEC+ 9.01INV - 0.004PI (11)
(2.23) (4.66) (0.78) (1.20) (3.06) (0.17)
(R 2 = 0.58, estimation period 1960-89, absolute value of White robust t-statistics in
parentheses), while the LZ regression is:
Dq = 6.40- 2.02LRGDP60+ 0.38LSEC - 4.32REVC - 0.016PI (12)
(7.48) (4.78) (1.35) (2.36) (0.56)
(R 2 = 0.50, estimation period 1960-89, absolute value of White robust t-statistics
in parentheses).50
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